Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2002

The State of Utah v. Jared Casanova : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J. Frederic Voros, Jr.; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellee.
Catherine E. Lilly, Lisa J. Remal; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Casanova, No. 20020527 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3856

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

JARED CASANOVA,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20020527-CA

:
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from a judgment of conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999); attempted theft, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1999); failure to respond to an
officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§41-6-13.5 (Supp. 2001); and attempted escape, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309 (1999), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Robin W. Reese, Judge, presiding.
CATHERINE E. LILLY (7746)
LISA J. REMAL (2722)

SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. (3340)
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P. O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee

Utah Court of Appeals

NOV - 8 2002
PautetteStagg
Clerk of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

PlaintifCAppellee,

:

v.

:

JARED CASANOVA,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20020527-CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999); attempted theft, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1999); failure to respond to an
officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§41-6-13.5 (Supp. 2001); and attempted escape, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309 (1999), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Robin W. Reese, Judge, presiding.
CATHERINE E. LILLY (7746)
LISA J. REMAL (2722)

SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. (3340)
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P. O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

1

PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT

3

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

5

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

9

ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ALLOWING
THE STATE TO USE A RACIALLY MOTIVATED PEREMPTORY
STRIKE AGAINST AN HISPANIC VENIREMAN WHERE THERE
WAS NO FACTUAL SUPPORT FOR THE STRIKE NOR ADEQUATE
FINDINGS IN SUPPORT OF THE COURT'S DECISION

9

A. The Question of Whether Casanova Made a Prima Facie Case
of Racial Discrimination Is Moot Since the State Proffered an
Explanation Without Alleging That Casanova Failed to Meet His
Burden

12

B. The Explanation Proffered by the Prosecutor Is Not Supported
in the Record and Is Therefore Legally Insufficient to Rebut
Casanova's Prima Facie Showing of Racial Discrimination in the
Jury Selection Process, Meriting Reversal and a New Trial in this
Case

16

C. Alternatively, Casanova's Case Merits Remand for Findings
Concerning the Batson Issue Since the Trial Court Failed to Make
Findings in Support if its Holding

24

Page
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
STATE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH
A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY GIVEN
THE AMBIGUOUS EVIDENCE GOING TO THE IDENTITY OF
THE PERPETRATOR AND SCANT EVIDENCE OF THE "FORCE
OR FEAR" ELEMENT
CONCLUSION

27
36

Addendum A: Judgment and Conviction

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Batson v. Kentucky. 476 U.S. 79 (1986)

4, 10, 11, 12, 13,
14,16,17,19,20,
21,23,24

Clark v. State. 564 S.E.2d 191 (Ga. 2002)

33

Cuestas v. State. 933 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. App. 1996)

17

Emerson v. State. 851 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)

21, 24

Giles v. State. 815 So. 2d 585 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000)

22, 24

Holland v. Illinois. 493 U.S. 474 (1990)

11

House v. State. 614 So. 2d 647 (Fla. App. 1993)

17

Purkett v. Elem. llSS.Ct. 1769(1995)

11, 12, 18,26

State v. Alvarez. 872 P.2d 450 (Utah 1994)

13, 14

State v. Bates. 309 N.C. 528, 308 S.E.2d 258 (1983)
State v. Bowman. 945 P.2d 153 (Utah App. 1997)
State v. Cannon. 2002 UT App 18,41 P.3d 1153
State v. Cantu. 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988) ("Cantu I")
State v. Cantu. 778 P.2d 517 (Utah 1989) ("Cantu II")

31
2, 12, 13
2, 10, 24, 25, 26
24
13, 14, 16, 17, 19,
20,23

State v. Colwell. 2000 UT 8, 994 P.2d 177

2, 12

State v. Emmett. 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992)

27, 31, 35
iii

Page
State v. Higginbotham. 917 P.2d 545 (Utah 1997)

10, 11, 12, 17, 23,
26

State v. Merrill. 928 P.2d 401 (Utah App. 1996)

11, 12, 18, 19, 26

State v. Ortiz. 804 A.2d 937 (Conn. App. 2002)

33

State v. Pharris. 846 P.2d 454 (Utah App.), cert, denied.
857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993)

2, 10, 17, 23, 24,
25,26

State v. Slappv. 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla.), cert, denied. 487 U.S.
1219 (1988)

17, 20, 21, 23, 24

State v. Suniville. 741 P.2d 961 (Utah 1987)
State v. Taylor. 884 P.2d 1293 (Utah App. 1994)
West Valley City v. Hoskins. 2002 UT App 223, 51 P.3d 52

34
2, 27, 28, 31, 35,
36
28

STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (Supp. 2001)

1,4

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999)

3, 28, 33, 34, 35

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999)

1, 3,4, 28, 33, 35

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1999)

1,4

Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309 (1999)

1,4

Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507 (1999)

4

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996)

1

iv

Page
Utah R. Crim. P. 18(c)(2)-(d) (2002)

11

U.S. Const, amend. XIV § 1

3, 10, 11, 24

v

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

JARED CASANOVA,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

CaseNo.20020527-CA

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count of aggravated
robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999); one
count of attempted theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6404 (1999); failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (Supp. 2001); and attempted escape, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309 (1999), in the Third Judicial
District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Robin W. Reese, Judge, presiding.
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)
(1996). See Addendum A (Judgment and Conviction).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in violation of Casanova's right to equal
protection when it allowed the State to exercise a racially-motivated peremptory strike
against the only Hispanic juror where the prosecutor's explanation was not supported by
the facts in the record and where the trial court failed to make adequate findings in

support of its determination?
Standard of Review: "A trial court's determination that the opponent of a
peremptory challenge has failed to prove purposeful racial discrimination 'generally turns
on the credibility of the proponent of the strike[.]' State v. ColwelL 2000 UT 8, ^[20, 994
P.2d 177. 'As this is a question of fact, we will not reverse the decision of the trial court
unless it is clearly erroneous.1 State v. Bowman. 945 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah App. 1997).
However, '[i]f the trial court fails to make adequate findings on the issue of
discrimination . . . [we] must remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.'
State v. Pharris. 846 P.2d 454, 459 (Utah App. 1993)." State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App
18,1J5, 41 P.3d 1153 (alterations original).
II. Did the trial court err in concluding that the State presented a prima facie case
of aggravated robbery where the evidence going to the identification of Casanova is
ambiguous and suggests a second unidentified person, and where evidence of "force or
fear" is scant?
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to submit a case to the jury will be
upheld if "'upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn
from it, the court concludes that some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury
could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'"
State v. Tavlor, 884 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah App. 1994) (quotation omitted).
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PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant Jared Casanova's ("Casanova") challenge to the State's peremptory
strike is preserved on the record for appeal ("R.") at R.157[83]. His challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence going to the State's case in chief is preserved at R.158[27678].
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following constitutional and statutory provisions are determinative of the
issues on appeal:
United States Constitution Amendment XIV, Section 1 - Due Process of Law,
Equal Protection:
. . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999) - Robbery:
(1) A person commits robbery if: (a) the person unlawfully and
intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property in the possession
of another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, by
means of force or fear; or (b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses
force or fear of immediate force against another in the course of
committing a theft.
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if it
occurs in an attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the
immediate flight after the attempt or commission.
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999) - Aggravated Robbery:

(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing
robbery, he: (a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in
Section 76-1-601; (b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or (c)
takes an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony..
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings,
and Disposition in the Court Below.
Appellant Jared Casanova ("Casanova") was charged by information with one
count of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 766-302 (1999); one count of attempted theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1999); one count of failure to respond to an officer's signal to
stop, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (Supp. 2001);
attempted escape, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309;
and false identity to a police officer, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-8-507(1999). R.2-5. An arrest warrant issued. R.l.
Casanova was bound over as charged. R.156. He was tried before a jury. R.15758. During voir dire, Casanova challenged the removal of Alfredo Gonzalez under
Batson v. Kentucky. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). R.157[83]. The trial court denied Casanova's
challenge. R.157[84-85].
At the close of the State's case, Casanova asserted that the State did not present a
prima facie case of aggravated robbery. R.158[276-78]. The trial court determined that
the State presented sufficient evidence for the charge to go to the jury. R.158[281-82].
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At the

.* >,v>~

going to the charge of presenting false identification to an officer. R.158[285-871
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Voir Uirc
\ lfredo Gonzales ("Goi izales") w< i::>, i i. .u u u »ei: of til i ::; ' ei lii e in i Casano v a's ti ial
It appears from the record that he was the only venireman of Hispanic dissent. During
questioning, Gonzales indicated that he was into "relaxation therapy" as a hobby.

I .11 liis I Mfiut ill llliiir I in n1 t null mi

.. . . illi

his fourth of four peremptory strikes. R.o2. (';isan<n:
race-neutral reason for striking Gonzalez R..57[83 J , The prosecutor articulated tu die
court that he •
didh i puin
-\ Hive
aes' answers in regards to a question that
f
[Casanova | suggested t - .
, and that is, then leisure activities. And
he responded . . . relaxation
py. which strikes mc as odd, and struck
me as a more liberal type of activity, and perhaps being a more liberal type
•M* individual would give more weight i^ the defendant than he probably
.,

. wv . ni; iiv. id Linn uic State pro J leivd a race-neutral reason for the strike

I !; 157[85]
Trial
Christopher Jacob Kesler ("Kesler") testified to the following facts at Casanova's
ti ial; Around 7:00 a m. on Novembu cs. _;ji;», ^csler was at his house preparing to go to
5

work. R.157[109], 158[23]. The sun was rising and it was light outside. R.158[23]. He
started his black 1993 Honda Prelude, parked in his driveway, to warm it up. R.157[ 10910]. Kesler went back into his house through the garage to finish getting ready for work.
R.157[109-10]. He was in the house approximately five minutes then sat on the stoop in
the garage to put on his boots. R.157[l 11,135].
In the reflection of the side view mirror of his stepfather's truck, which was parked
in the garage alongside his mother's car, Kesler saw a car drive by the house.
R.157[l 11]. The car stopped and an individual approached the house. R.l 57[111].
Kesler continued to lace up his boots because he thought the person would be coming to
the door momentarily. R.157[lll].
Then Kesler heard his own car door open and close. R.157[l 12]. He ran to his
car, opened the driver's side door, and saw a man sitting in the driver's seat with his hand
on the steering wheel. R.157[l 12,136]. Within seconds, the man let go of the steering
wheel, reached toward his belt buckle and raised his shirt. R.157[l 13-14], R.158[26].
Kesler and the man never said anything to each other during the confrontation, and the
man did not verbalize in any manner that he had a gun or weapon. R. 157[ 137]. The two
men were within twelve inches of one another at the time. R. 157[ 152]. Kesler admitted
that he never actually saw any weapon or gun. R.157[ 137].
Kesler ran back into his house scared because he thought the man had a gun and
feared for his life or that he would be shot and hurt. R.157[ 114,138,153]. Kesler alerted
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his parents that someone \\:w ^ r ; K -

:

-

i- • •

uother, Kathleen Snodgrass ("Snodgrass"), v.eiu back outside. R. 157|

" i Kesler

initially testified at trial and the preliminary hearing that he saw the cai stalled in the
. :.-\;^
claimc » *-

i cross-examination at UKJ

•

u

~

|

Kesler and Snodgrass got into Snodv.nss 1 truck and started to follow the cai
R ,1 57[116-17]. Snodgrass dro\"c while Kesler phoned 911 on his cell phone.
. . ..esler kept tlK

*

s

,'tl., -.iiv-iiv.i updated as to the driver's location.
Iliicci Phillip Hlcilsoii Mailed

chasing the man in his patrol car. R.157[ 120-21].
Ellertson eventually stopped the man, later identified as Casanova, after a twenty four minute high-speed chase when Casanova crashed into a parked car in a residential
, .*;

.

in Ellertson's patrol cai.

..

a . . ^punx^; . i, > niu) set up

Lllerlson's patrol :::ai cai i le tc a I lalt as w ell > • I lei 11 le i ai i n: I xed

into the black Honda. R. 157[ 178 J. Casanova jumped out of the car and fled on foot into
> noiise R. 157[ 178]. He was apprehended and taken to the
u'ivniii I I H I T he Ini'il In |iinip i Inn v IK I 'i | I h | I Ilk; w JU shackled, culled behind In .

back, and placed in the back seat of Ellertson's patrol car, further secured, by a seat belt

TM57R79].
Casanova was left unattended lui a lew moments while Ellertson and other
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officers finished investigating the crime scene. R.157[181]. Ellertson started the patrol
car and backed it up a few feet to observe damage to his patrol car. R.157[181-82]. He
turned the car off but left the keys in the ignition while he stepped away from the car to
view the damage. R.157[182]. Within a few minutes, officers noticed that Casanova
had somehow gotten into the driver's seat of the patrol car, put the car in gear, and had
driven it into the stolen Honda again. R.157[182]. The officers rushed to secure
Casanova. R.157[183]. Casanova was taken into custody. R.157[224-25]. A search of
his person and the black Honda revealed no weapons. R.157[202].
Kesler gave a description of the man he initially encountered in his Honda that
was different than Casanova. He described the man to the 911 dispatcher as Tongan or
Polynesian, and claimed he had a black mustache. R.157[145]. At the preliminary
hearing, he said the man had a shaved-bald head, mustached and goatee. R. 158[ 146-48].
At trial, Kesler explained that he was describing Casanova as he appeared at the
preliminary hearing when he testified that he was bald. R. 157[ 147]. He acknowledged
that the prosecutor at the preliminary hearing specifically asked him what Casanova
looked like at the time of the offense, to which Kesler responded that he was bald.
R.157[147].
The photograph taken of Casanova shortly after he was apprehended that same
day shows that Casanova is Hispanic rather than Polynesian, had a full head of short hair
and no facial hair except for light growth above his lip and on his chin. See State's

8

3

57[202] I Joi letheless Keslei testified tl tat 1:1 le i i mi i ii: I tl ic pi lotogi apl I w as

ilic same man that he initially encountered at his Honda. R. 157[ 132]. Snodgrass
rimilarly identified Casanova as tlic man she observed driving the Honda away from their
i. .uAii}

D8[256].

SUMMARY OF THE AUCJDIMENT
Hie trial court erred in holding that the State's peremptory strike against an
Hispanic venireman was not racially motivated in violation of Casanova's rights under
; c Lqual P r o t e a n ^ v uuisc. i ;K Mate ^ explanation wa- not legally supported ;n the
upport
of its holding,
In addition, the trial court erred in holding that the State made a prima facie case
cf aggravated robbery where the evidence shows that someone i--ther (ha; Casano\ a was
jed aggravated robbery. Moreover, the evidence going to tVk

lorce

c i fear" elen lent is scai it Coi lseqi iei itl> , tl lei c: is i 10 1: ^lte - able e \ - idence fron i"
jury could conclude that Casanova was guilt\ *H*\ond a reasonable doubt.
ARt
_,;••
.: AJ i fS DISCRETION IN ALLOW ING
l i l h M A J L i u u ^ b A i<A(Jl ALL Y MOTIVATED PEREMPTORY
STRIKE AGAINST AN HISPANIC VENIREMAN W HERE THERE
WAS NO FACTUAL SUPPORT FOR THE STRIKE NOR ADEQUATE
FINDINGS IN SUPPORT OF THE COURT' S DECISION.
The trial court abused its discretion in accepting the State's explanation behind a

9

peremptory strike against Alfredo Gonzales, an Hispanic venireman. See State v.
Cannon. 2002 UT App 18, T|5, 41 P.3d 1153. The strike was racially motivated in
violation of Casanova's equal protection rights to the extent that the State's explanation
was not borne out in the evidence discovered during voir dire. See Batson v. Kentucky.
476 U.S. 79 (1986); U.S. Const, amend. XIV § 1 (Equal Protection); see also State v.
Higginbotham. 917 P.2d 545 (Utah 1997). Moreover, the trial court did not make
adequate findings to support its decision that the strike was not racially motivated. See
State v. Cannon. 2002 UT App 18, 41 P.3d 1153; Sta te v. Pharris. 846 P.2d 454 (Utah
App. 1993).
In the present case, the State struck Gonzales with its fourth of four peremptory
strikes. R.62. Casanova objected to the strike under Batson. R.157[83]. The prosecutor
did not contend that Casanova failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, but
rather responded to the challenge with the explanation that he
didn't particularly like Mr. Gonzales' answers in regards to a question that
Ms. Remal suggested to the court, and that is, their leisure activities. And
he responded,... relaxation therapy, which struck me as odd, and struck
me as a more liberal type of activity, and perhaps being a more liberal type
of individual would give more weight to the defendant than he probably
should.
R.157[84].
The trial court accepted the response, stating:
[I] accepted as a race neutral reason Mr. Esqueda's explanation as to why
he struck Mr. Gonzales. The case that I remember, at least, says that even
though, if a race neutral reason is offered that's sufficient even if there
10

- .^.kin t iv uiie tllat Liu . , ' J : I O : aiiNonc LIMJ migiiL "tihiiK -wuki j a.>ni\ me
striking. And Mr. Esqueda offered that kind of a reason, so I'll accent tlvt.
^ 15~[85] The record does not contain any oral or 'written findings supporting the
court's decision.
i i >ai>wi

*,

•

.

. ^ v.

.;".». *

. ' ; i ii

s

exercise peremptory challenges "Tor am rv,^ *

y

>

his view concerning the outcome of the case to be tried,. . . the Equal Protection Clause
• JTUUS ihc prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race.

"

, .): see also Purkettv.Elem. 115 S Ct 1 ; 69
0995; vpci av * "

' *'

1 (E< [I ii il I h < >ti :d h n: I); I Jti il R C i

I ""'

Ifc(c)(2)-(d)(2002) (providing for exercise of peremptory strikes). The Court noted that
"[t]he reality of practice, amply reflected in many state and 'federal court opinions, shows
I I in, il! H i

Ii.illciigc mas be, and u n i o r t u n a t e l y at t i m e s lias b e e n , u s e d to di-^j .m.- ; i*e

. . ^ n ,il 1 »1;H"k jurors

W ' iv<|iiiim*' lnal i IHIIIIIM lien h r s c n s i l r v hi llliii" ii-ii I;I

r

, :

discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, our decision enforces the mandate of equal
protection and furthers the ends of justice." IcL at 99.
BatSQi

_...:_. .K ,;:,.:. . i ,/k;nDcr-. .*. *.

vOgnizaDic u^iiu ^ruupi .;

from diseritinitialiun in flu jim scloi linn pun t^s I lolland \. Illinois 4 ( n 11 S 4 "'•! -I"'ii
7 7 (1990). Batson has also been adopted in Utah. See, e.g.. State v. Higginbothamu 917
P.2d 545. 547 (Utah 1996); State v. Merrill 928 P.2d 4P1 10^-0^ (Utah App. 1996).
^••i baiMM

,

..:...,

. c-part test under

which a court should conduct a Batson analysis." Merrill 928 P.2d at 403 (citing
Purkett, 115 S.Ct. at 1770-71; Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 547)).
"[0]nce the opponent of a peremptory challenge has made out a prima
facie case of racial discrimination (step 1), the burden of production shifts
to the proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral
explanation (step 2). If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial
court must then decide (step 3) whether the opponent of the strike has
proved purposeful racial discrimination."
Merrill, 928 P.2d at 403 (quoting Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 547 (citing Purkett, 115
S.Ct. at 1771)). Each step is examined "in turn." Id.
A. The Question of Whether Casanova Made a Prima Facie Case of Racial
Discrimination Is Moot since the State Proffered an Explanation Without
Alleging That Casanova Failed to Meet His Burden.
In the present case, the State automatically responded to Casanova's Batson
challenge without registering any complaint that he did not make a prima facie case of
racial discrimination, thereby rendering the issue moot on appeal. R.157[84]. "Where
the proponent of the peremptory challenge fails to contest the sufficiency of the prima
facie case at trial and merely provides a rebuttal explanation for the challenge, the issue
of whether a prima facie case was established is waived." Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at
547; see also State v. Colwell 2000 UT 8,1[18, 994 P.2d 177; State v. Bowman, 945
P.2d 153, 155 n.2 (Utah App. 1997). This is true regardless of whether the reviewing
court doubts the adequacy of the prima facie case made by the party challenging the
strike. See Merrill, 928 P.2d at 403 (despite "grave doubts" about adequacy of prima
facie case, this Court held the issue was waived where prosecutor offered explanation for
12

strike • ^ > itl i :>i it cl lallei ig.ii ig pi ii i la facie case)
In fact, Casanova made a legitimate prima facie case of racial discrimination
which leaves nothing to doubt for purposes of the first step of the Batson analysis.
I he elements necessary to [] a prima facie case IIK iude * • a^ complete a
record as possible, (2) a showing that persons excluded h-Sonc io i
cognizable group under the representative cross-section rule, and \ 3) a
showing that there exists "a strong likelihood thai such persons are being
challenged because of their group association rather than because of any
specific bias."
State v. Cantm 778 P.2d * P - 1 R 1 0 a T mh 1989) (quotation omitted) (Cantu II).
>.:i,,'\ ; s.u • tor./aies are members oi Uic Name Hispanic
'

i:

'~ ^^e Batson. -:"

makes racial peremptory strike against venireman sharing defendant's race). Second,
Gonzales was one of only two people with Hispanic surnames on the pane], the other
(K'tsoii was I alh\ hujillo K I % ('| I*' ,'U|
1

I rujillo w a s not c ^ v ' -n-jtu ].»< caue>c nor w a s

"

,a

juror since counsel had filled all the jury slots before she came up in line, I' ^

;

Gonzales' Hispanic surname alone does not make him a minority for purposes of
Batson. See Bowman, <<; •• : ... „ ... . *. Stale v. Alvarez. 872 v. A 450. 4*7 n .6 (I Jtah
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i-'i

V L Bowmaii. — >

l\2d a: ,56. "Utah courts have never found a Spanish surname alone sufficient to show
minority status unless that minority status was corroborated by the trial court or the jurors
tl lei i isel\ es, or \\ a •> anaispau,u

.*.:

onsequently; Gonzales is a member of the

Hispanic community, a cognizable minority group recognized by the Utah Supreme
Court, for purposes of Batson. See Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 457 n.6 ("Hispanics [are] a
cognizable ethnic group").
In addition, Casanova made out a prima facie case of discrimination since it was
based on a thorough voir dire conducted on the record that reveals "'a strong likelihood
that such persons are being challenged because of their group association rather than
because of any specific bias."' Cantu, 778 P.2d at 581 (quotation omitted). All the
veniremen were asked questions to ferret out bias, such as whether they knew the
prosecutor, defense counsel or Casanova, R.157[23-25]; whether they understood and
could abide by the concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, R.157[26]; whether they
could acquit or convict depending upon the quality of the evidence in light of the
reasonable doubt standard, R.157[27]; whether they could evaluate an officer's testimony
without giving it too much or too little weight, R.157[28-29]; whether they or any family
members were charged with the same crimes that Casanova faced, R.157[32-33];
whether they or their family were victims of crime, R.157[35-44]; whether any of them
were acquainted with police officers, R.157[ [44-48]; whether any of them had a physical
impairment that would affect their ability to hear the evidence, R.157[50-52]; whether
any of them had an important scheduling conflict, R.157[53]; whether any of them knew
anyone else on the panel, R.157[65]; and whether any of them had family that practiced
law. R.157[70]. Gonzales did not indicate that any of the above questions were an issue
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for him or would interfere w n

._a; .cncuu.

The venire was asked a set oi biographical questions as \\ ell, such as their
occupations, hobbies, education levels, and their sources of news and information. I u
tl lese qi lestioi is, Gonzales responded that lie was a real estate agent. R.15 7"[55],. He

physical education. R.i57[63j. lie also mentioned that he was into "relaxation therapy"
as a hobby R 157[67].
. ehpuc u

*;L • innocuous answers uiuing \^n one. he was struck while other

venirer

example,

Gonzales did not reply that he had any acquaintances who were police officers.
However, Carolyn Olsen, who ultimately sat as a juror, had a son and daughter-in-law
.. !Avic xUiiw^ Mi iiiv ^,ni [ akc County jail. R.157[46], Moreover, while
* •;.

•

AUC ;,aren

Gorzitze, who alsu ultimately sat as a juror, knew each ( \

--n

worked with Gorzitze's husband. R 157[65-66]. In addition, Gonzales was struck for
having liberal tendencies on account oi in* interest in "relaxation therapy." R.. 157[67],
( i 111 g C i 1" J i i 1 1 l ^ »! 1 ^ »" 11 < 11 " 11111 I 1111111111' 11 ' . I n 1 11

11» K I i p u l i 1111 a 11

11 (in r 11 I mi n 111 n -

camping. R.157[08j. People who like the outdoors can be quite liberal in their poli
views, Notwithstanding this fact. Niclson was not struck and actually sat on the
empaneleu ./•-

In light of the foregoing, Gonzales was a member of a cognizable ethnic minority
and none of the ample record evinced any specific bias by his answers. Indeed, his
answers were innocuous compared to those of other veniremen who were not struck and
who actually sat on the jury. Consequently, there exists "'a strong likelihood that
[Gonzales] was challenged because of [his] group association rather than because of any
specific bias."' Cantu, 778 P.2d at 518 (quotation omitted). Under Batson, therefore,
Casanova presented a prima facie case of racial discrimination. See Cantu II, 778 P.2d at
518-19.
B. The Explanation Proffered by the Prosecutor Is Not Supported in the
Record and Is Therefore Legally Insufficient to Rebut Casanova's Prima
Facie Showing of Racial Discrimination in the Jury Selection Process,
Meriting Reversal and a New Trial in this Case.
The prosecutor explained that he struck Gonzales because he believed "relaxation
therapy . . . [is] a more liberal type of activity, and perhaps being a more liberal type of
individual would give more with to the defendant than he probably should." R.157[84].
The trial court accepted the explanation as race-neutral and sufficient to rebut Casanova's
prima facie claim of discrimination. R. 157[85]. The court did not make any findings to
support its conclusion, however.
Although "relaxation therapy" in and of itself does not necessarily mean that a
person is liberal, to the extent that the prosecutor associated it with liberal tendencies in
his explanation renders the explanation facially acceptable. Concern over a venireman's
liberal tendencies has been held to be a facially acceptable explanation. See State v.
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Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 23 (Fla.) (noting that "liberalism" presented a race-neutral
explanation for peremptory strike), cert, denied 487 U.S. 1219 (1988); Cuestas v. State,
933 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. App. 1996) ("fact that venirepersons are 'liberal' is a raceneutral explanation for the use of a peremptory strike") (citations omitted).
Nonetheless, "the inquiry does not end when the state articulates a facially
acceptable reason; the trial court must also find record support for the reason to ensure
the state has not given a pretextual explanation for an inappropriate challenge." House v.
State, 614 So.2d 647, 648 (Fla. App. 1993) (citing Slappv. 522 So.2d at 23). "The state
must be prepared to support its explanations with neutral reasons based on answers
provided at voir dire or otherwise disclosed on the record itself. This requirement helps
ensure procedural regularity and racial neutrality." Slappy, 522 So.2d at 23.
In Utah, this means that the "trial court [must] decide whether the opponent of the
peremptory challenge has proved purposeful racial discrimination. This determination
generally turns on the credibility of the proponent of the strike and will not be set aside
unless it is clearly erroneous." Higginbothairu 917 P.2d at 548 (citing Batson, 476 U.S.
at 98 n.21; Cantu II. 778 P.2d at 518; State v. Pharris. 846 P.2d 454, 464-65 (Utah App),
cert, denied 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993)).
"To show clear error, the appellant must marshal all of the evidence in support of
the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings against an attack." Id.
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(citations omitted). u'[T]he ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation
rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.'" Merrill, 928 P.2d at 403
(quoting Purkett, 115 S.Ct. at 1771).
The trial court made the following finding in support of the State's peremptory
strike:
I've ruled on the objections and denied all of them and accepted as a raceneutral reason Mr. Esqueda's explanation as to why he struck Mr.
Gonzales. The case that I remember, at least, says that even though, if a
race-neutral reason is offered that's sufficient even if there wouldn't be one
that the court or anyone else might thing would justify the striking. And
Mr. Esqueda offered that kind of a reason, so I'll accept that.
R.157[84-85]. The marshaled evidence in support of the court's finding regarding the
strike of Gonzalez is as follows:
- Gonzales was the only juror to offer "relaxation therapy" as his hobby.
R.157[67].
- The other venireman with an Hispanic surname, Cathy Trujillo, was not struck.
R.63.
- The prosecutor, Carlos Esqueda, is an Hispanic himself.1

Since the trial court's finding do not assert that any of the other "liberal" jurors
were struck, Casanova limits his marshalled evidence to that directly pertaining to
Gonzales. Any other discussion as to the liberal attitudes of other jurors is purely
speculative. To the extent that their potential liberal tendencies may bear upon the strike
of Gonzales, the following evidence is in the record:
- The other jurors took part in more common hobbies including golf (Gorzitze,
Jorgensen, Johnson), reading (Hansen, Jankowski, Brusch, Trujillo, Wooley), guitar
(Kidrick), private pilot (Dart), scrapbooking (Kenison), writing (Wilkinson, Whitely),
18

In order for a peremptory strike to survive a Batson challenge, the prosecutor's
explanation must be "'(1) neutral, (2) related to the case being tried, (3) clear and
reasonably specific, and (4) legitimate.1" Cantu II, 778 P.2d at 518 (quotation omitted);
see also Merrill 928 P.2d at 403-04 (citations omitted). "'[T]he presence of one or more
of the [following] factors will tend to show that the state's reasons are not actually
supported by the record or are an impermissible pretext: (1) alleged group bias not shown
to be shared by the juror in question, (2) failure to examine the juror or perfunctory
examination, assuming neither the trial court nor opposing counsel had questioned the
juror, (3) singling the juror out for special questioning designed to evoke a certain
response, (4) the prosecutor's reason is unrelated to the facts of the case, and (5) a
challenge based on reasons equally applicable to juror [sic] who were not challenged."5

internet (Wilkinson), running (Wilkinson, Blaylock), camping (Nielson, Kelson,
Rillston), family (Perry, Jankowski, Pedersen, Olsen, Trujillo, Wooley), walking (Perry,
Pedersen), trap shooting (Bartschi, Johnson), fishing (Sander, Rillston, Johnson),
gardening (White), stamp collecting (Brusch), sports (Robison), crafts (Hanes),
volunteerism (Hanes, Stuker, Wooley). R.157[67-68].
- The State struck Douglas Wilkinson, whose hobbies included writing, the
internet, and running. R.157[68]. He was a civil litigator with Ray Quinney & Nebeker,
and had several family members involved in the practice of criminal law, including
former Attorney General David Wilkinson. R.157[70-71].
- The State struck Maryjane Blaylock. R.62. Blaylock could have been a liberal
as well considering she was a retired school teacher. R.157[57]. She also had a college
degree in education. R.157[64].
- The State struck Carrene Kiddrick. R.62. She had a son who was in criminal
trouble, although she did not know which crimes he was involved in. R.157[32-33].
Although she had been "terrorized" when her home was burglarized, she did not feel that
would affect her impartiality. R.157[35,40].
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Cantu II. 778 P.2d at 518-19 (quoting Slappv. 522 So.2d at 22).
Even in light of the marshaled evidence, the State's explanation fails for lack of
record support and, more importantly, because it is a racially-motivated pretext to remove
Gonzales. See id. First, Gonzales and Casanova were both Hispanics. See Batson, 476
U.S. at 84 (defendant's equal protection rights are violated when a juror of his or her
same race is removed for race-based reasons) (citation omitted).
Moreover, it means little that the other veniremember with an Hispanic surname,
Trujillo, was not struck. Trujillo was far down on the list of veniremen and the jury was
selected before the parties had to consider her. R.62-63. Any seasoned trial attorney like
Carlos Esqueda would weigh that in to their calculations about who to strike, and would
not waste a valuable peremptory strike on someone who would never come up to sit.
Further, the record does not verify that Trujillo was actually Hispanic. She may be a
non-Hispanic person who took on a husband's Hispanic surname.
In addition, nothing in the record establishes that Gonzales actually shared in the
group bias that the State assumed he harbored, nor did the State ask any follow-up
questions of Gonzales to confirm or deny that he actually was "liberal." The State
similarly failed to clarify through questioning what Gonzales meant by his ambiguous
response, "relaxation therapy." R.157[67]. This is not a common term with a meaning
accepted among the community, nor a generally accepted set of accompanying
characteristics. It could mean a lot of things or it could simply be a tongue-and-cheek
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response, much as one might say they are into "couch potato therapy" or "shoe shopping
therapy" when asked what they do as a hobby.
The State's failure to ask the critical follow up questions evinces an impermissible
racial pretext in striking Gonzales. Under similar circumstances, other jurisdictions have
held that failure to ask follow-up questions to verify the existence of suspected liberalism
falls short of the protections afforded by Batson and the Equal Protection Clause. For
example, in Slappy, the State struck two African American veniremen because they were
elementary school teachers. See 522 So.2d at 19-20. The prosecutor believed that their
occupations would make them more liberal and more sympathetic to the defendant, yet
he did not question them to establish whether their bias actually existed. Id The Florida
Supreme Court held that the state's explanation was an impermissible pretext, stating:
the utter failure to question two of the challenged jurors on the grounds
alleged for bias renders the state's explanation immediately suspect.
Moreover, we cannot accept the state's contention that all elementary
school assistants, and these two in particular, were liberal. If they indeed
possessed this trait, the state could have established it by a few questions
taking very little of the court's time.... By failing to ask any questions, the
state failed to demonstrate that the alleged "liberalism" of these two jurors
actually existed.
Id. at 23-24 (citations and footnotes omitted).
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals came to a similar conclusion in Emerson v.
State, 851 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), where the prosecutor removed an
African-American venireman who he believed was either a college student or a
professor, and the prosecutor assumed that such a person would be liberal. Id at 274.
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The prosecutor did not ask any questions to confirm that the venireman actually
possessed those liberal characteristics. Id. The Court consequently found the state's
explanation to be "insufficient as a matter of law to rebut appellant's prima facie showing
of racial discrimination." Id.; see also Giles v. State. 815 So.2d 585, 588 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2000) (reversible error to uphold strike based on inadequate explanation where
state did not ask follow-up questions of African-American venireman who was
"religious" to confirm assumption that she "would not be able to sit in judgment of
another person").
If anything, the evidence that was before the court in this case establishes that
Gonzales did not share in any alleged bias. When polled, Gonzales indicated by not
raising his hand in objection that he would abide by the reasonable doubt standard and
that he would either acquit or convict according to the quality of the evidence in light of
that standard, R.157[26-27]; that he was not acquainted with any of the parties, witnesses
or other veniremen involved in the case, R.157[23-25, 44-48, 65]; that he would not give
undue weight, or inappropriately discredit, the testimony of an officer, R.157[28-29];
that neither he nor his family had ever been charged with the same crimes with which
Casanova was charged, R.157[32-33]; that he did not have a physical impairment or
important scheduling conflict that would interfere with his ability to sit as a juror,
R.157[50-53]; that neither he nor his family were involved in the practice of law,
R.157[70]; and that neither he nor his family had ever been victims of crime. R.157[35-
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44].
In addition, the same challenge based on liberal tendencies could have been made
against two others that were not struck and who actually sat as a jurors. See Cantu II,
778 P.2d at 519 (quoting Slappy, 522 So.2d at 22). Ginger Nielson was in to camping
and she was divorced. R.157[56,68]. Alva Dart was a private pilot who was single as
well. R.157[55,68]. Both of them were unmarried, which suggests they were
unconventional in Utah Society. Moreover, many liberal people gravitate to camping
and the outdoors; likewise, an independent thinker might take up flying as a likely hobby.
Nonetheless, the State did not strike either of these individuals and the consequently sat
as jurors during Casanova's trial. R.62-63.
Of greater concern are the two individuals that the State did not strike despite
indications of possible bias. Karen Gorzitze and Carolyn Olsen had known each other
for 20 years since Olsen worked with Gorzitze's husband. R.157[65-66]. Moreover,
Olsen had a son and daughter-in-law that were officers in the Salt Lake County Jail.
R.157[46]. Gonzales, by contrast, did not have any association with any of the venire
and did not have any associations with officers that might color his opinion.
Nonetheless, he was struck while Gorzitze and Olsen sat. R.62-63.
In light of the foregoing, the State's explanation does not legitimately rebut the
prima facie case of racial discrimination made by Casanova. See Higginbotham, 917
P.2d at 548 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21, Cantu IL 778 P.2d at 518; Pharns, 846
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P.2d at 464-65). The record derived through voir dire does not legally support the State's
explanation. See, Slappv, 522 So.2d at 23-24; Emerson, 851 S.W.2d at 274; Giles, 815
So.2d at 588. Moreover, the State failed to ask follow-up questions to verify that
Gonzales in fact harbored the liberal attitude that the State suspected. Id, Accordingly,
the trial court abused its discretion in holding that the peremptory strike was non-racial,
violating Casanova's right to equal protection and meriting reversal and remand of
Casanova's case for a new trial. IcL; see U.S. Const, amend. XIV § 1 (Equal Protection).
C. Alternatively, Casanova's Case Merits Remand for Findings
Concerning the Batson Issue since the Trial Court Failed to Make Findings
in Support of its Holding.
Utah law provides an alternate remedy where, as here, the trial court makes
inadequate or no findings and legal conclusions in support of its holding that a
peremptory strike is not racially motivated. "When a 'trial court insufficiently assesses
the facts or law relevant to the challenge' our case law directs us to remand the case to the
trial court 'to record sufficient findings of fact and conclusions on all the evidence
relevant to its decision, to facilitate appellate review.'" State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18
at 1fl2 (quoting Pharris, 846 P.2d at 465; citing State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 597 (Utah
1988) (Cantu I)). "'If, on remand, the trial court determines that racial discrimination
motivated . . . the prosecutor's peremptory challenge[], it must reverse [the] defendant's
conviction and retry his case.'" Id, (quoting Pharris, 846 P.2d at 465 (citing Batson, 476
U.S. at 100)) (alterations original).
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In holding that the State rebutted the prima facie case of discrimination, the trial
court merely stated,
I've ruled on the objections and denied all of them and accepted as a raceneutral reason Mr. Esqueda's explanation as to why he struck Mr.
Gonzales. The case that I remember, at least, says that even though, if a
race-neutral reason is offered that's sufficient even if there wouldn't be one
that the court or anyone else might thing would justify the striking. And
Mr. Esqueda offered that kind of a reason, so I'll accept that.
R.157[84-85].
In making adequate findings, trial courts are supposed to discuss on the record the
criteria set forth in Point LB. of this brief. See Cannon, 2002 UT App 18 at ^13-14
(noting that trial court must consider on record whether explanation is neutral, related to
the case, clear and specific, and legitimate; remanding case for findings where trial
court's holding was "conclusory".) The trial court in this case made no mention at all of
those factors, however.
Moreover, the court did not make any appropriate legal conclusions. Rather, it
only vaguely referenced a case that it had in mind in making its decision without actually
naming it, let alone premising a legal conclusion upon it. R.157[85]. If anything, it is
unclear from the trial court's brief statement that it understood that it needed more than
just a race-neutral explanation, as opposed to one that was supported in the facts so as
not to be an impermissible pretext. See Pharris, 846 P.2d at 464 (remanding for findings
and conclusions of law where findings "misstated applicable law"); Cannon, 2002 UT
App 18 at ^[ 13 (noting that trial court must "determine the legitimacy of the prosecutor's
25

explanation) (emphasis added).
The trial court similarly failed to make any comment on the credibility of the
prosecutor in defending the peremptory strike. Id. (noting that inadequacy of findings is
"exemplified" in absence of "evaluation of credibility"). In short, the trial court did not
carry out its duty to carefully assess on the record "'whether the opponent of the strike
has proved purposeful racial discrimination.'" Merrill, 928 P.2d at 403 (quoting
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 547 (citing Purkett. 115 S.Ct. at 1771)); see also Phams, 846
P.2d at 464 (noting that it is trial court's duty to comprehensively analyze whether
opponent of strike has established purposeful discrimination injury selection process).
Absent findings of fact or conclusions of law, this Court does not have the
information necessary to assess this issue on appeal. See Cannon, 2002 UT App 18 at
ffi[12-16; Pharns, 846 P.2d at 464-65. "Because of the necessity of evaluating the
discrimination issue according to specific analytical guidelines, the trial court must create
a complete record. . . . Any lack of record or trial court failure to rule on the issue of
race-neutrality creates difficulty in assessing the adequacy of the prosecutor's explanation
on appeal." Id. at 464. Accordingly, Casanova's case should be remanded to the trial
court for appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Cannon, 2002 UT App
18; Pharns, 846 P.2d at 464-65.
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
STATE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH A
PRIMA FACIE CASE OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY GIVEN THE
AMBIGUOUS EVIDENCE GOING TO THE IDENTITY OF THE
PERPETRATOR AND SCANT EVIDENCE OF THE " FORCE OR
FEAR" ELEMENT.
Casanova moved to dismiss the aggravated robbery charge on the basis that the
State failed to make a prima facie case against him, noting that Kesler identified a man
that looked different from Casanova as the person who initially took his car, and his
weak, uncorroborated testimony concerning his belief that the man had a gun.
R.158[276-79].
A trial court must dismiss a charge "if the State did not establish a prima facie
case against the defendant by producing 'believable evidence of all the elements of the
crime charged."' State v. Emmett 839 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1992) (quotation omitted).
The charge can only go to the jury if "'the jury acting fairly and reasonably could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Taylor, 884 P.2d 1293, 1296
(Utah App. 1994) (quotation omitted). A trial court's decision to submit a case to the
jury will be upheld on appeal only if, "'upon reviewing the evidence an all inferences that
can be reasonably drawn from it, the court concludes that some evidence exists from
which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. (quotation omitted).
By this standard, the trial court erred in submitting the aggravated robbery charge
to the jury. In explaining its decision, the trial court noted that,
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"Kesler and his mother identified the defendant as the person who was
initially in the car at their residence and the same person who was in police
custody at the South Jordan police station. Their identification was firm
and appeared to be unequivocal and would be sufficient to warrant
submitting the case to the j u r y . . . .
[A]gain, it would be my conclusion that there was sufficient force or
fear demonstrated . . . when Mr. Kesler first approached the person who
had gotten into his car after he heard someone open his door and close it.
He saw the person lift his shirt with one hand, reach towards his waist
band. He assumed that they were reaching for a weapon, and that would be
an assumption that would not be illogical or unreasonable and one, which
the trier of fact, if they chose to believe that evidence, could conclude that
it was indicative of someone reaching for a weapon.
R.158[281-82].
For purposes of this appeal and according to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999),
"(1) t a ] person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery h e : . .
. (c) takes an operable motor vehicle." Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999),
"(1) [a] person commits robbery if: (a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or
attempts to take personal property in the possession of another from his person, or
immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or fear. . . ."2
The marshaled evidence in support of the State's case is as follows:3
- Kesler walked out of his house to find a man he later identified as Casanova in
2

The State charged Casanova under this variation of aggravated robbery. R.2.
The trial court accordingly instructed the jury. R.75. Consequently, the other possible
variations of aggravated robbery are not at issue in this appeal.
3

A party challenging the sufficiency of the evidence bears the burden of
marshaling the evidence in a light most favorable to the State's case. See. State v. Taylor,
884 P.2d at 1296; West Valley Citv v. Hoskins, 2002 UT App 223, Tfl3, 51 P.3d 52
(citations omitted).
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the driver seat of his car. R.157[l 12-13,136].
- Just minutes earlier, Kesler had turned on the ignition of the car and left it
running while he went into his house to finish getting ready for work. R.157[ 109-10].
Kesler was sitting in his garage putting on his work boots when he saw through the
mirror of his stepfather's truck a car stop near his house and an individual approach.
R.157[l 11]. Kesler next heard his car door open and close, at which point he went out to
the car to see what was happening. R.157[112].
- Kesler opened the car door. R.157[l 12]. Kesler and the man did not exchange
any words, and the man did not verbally indicate a threat or that he was armed.
However, the man let go of the steering wheel, lifted his shirt and reached toward his
waistband. Kesler ran back into his house because he thought the man had a gun.
R.157[l 14,138, 153]. He told his parents that a man who had a gun was stealing his car.
R.157[115].
- Kesler and his mother, Snodgrass, went back outside in time to see the car stalled
in the street in front of their house. R.157[l 15-16,155]. Kesler also testified that he saw
the car rolling into the street and then stall. R.157[ 139-40].
- Kesler and Snodgrass followed the car. Snodgrass drove while Kesler called
911 on a cell phone. R.157[l 16-17].
- Kesler reported to 911 that the man in his car was either Tongan or Polynesian
and had dark, dark hair, and "light facial hair" similar to a mustache. R.157[ 123-24]. At
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the preliminary hearing, the State asked Kesler how the man appeared when he was in his
car. R.156[32];157[147]. Kesler replied that the man that took his car had a shaved-bald
head, mustache and goatee. R.157[ 145-47]. Kesler explained the discrepant physical
descriptions by saying that he was describing Casanova as he appeared at the preliminary
hearing when he said he was bald. R.157[147].
- Kesler was within twelve inches of the man, but only saw him for a few seconds
before Kesler ran back into his house. R.157[127,138,152][ Kesler was excited during
the encounter. Both of these factors may have clouded his perception of the man in the
car.
- Kesler told the officers the morning that Casanova was apprehended that he was
the same man that took his car. R. 15 7 [ 15 0 ].
- Kesler testified that he did not allow or give the man permission to get in his car.
R.157[113]
- Snodgrass said she saw the man in the side mirror of Kesler's car when they
followed him in her car. R.158[256,264]. He had dark skin, dark eyes, facial hair, and
dark slicked-back hair. R.158[256,267]. She was positive he had a mustache.
R.158[267]. She could not see the man's face below his lips as she viewed him in the
side mirror. R.158[268]. She also saw the man's face when he made a u-turn withing
five or six feet of her car, as well as when he passed her as he drove out of a dead-end
street. R.158[256]. She testified that the man she saw stalled in the car and making the
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u-turn was Casanova. R.158[256-57]. She also testified that she saw Casanova at the
police station after he was arrested later that morning when he was cuffed and escorted
by two police officers. R.158[269,273]. She further testified that the photo of Casanova
(State's Exhibit #7) is the man she saw stalled in the car and at the station. R.158[274].
- Casanova led police on a twenty-four minute car chase before he lost control of
the car and crashed into a parked car in a residential neighborhood. See Video Tape. He
was arrested at that point.
This evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to the State's case,
does not establish a prima facie case of aggravated robbery. See Emmett, 839 P.2d at
784 (quotation and citations omitted); Taylor, 884 P.2d at 1296 (quotation and citations
omitted).
First, the evidence does not adequately establish Casanova was the man involved
in the alleged aggravated robbery. "[I]f the evidence is sufficient only to raise a
suspicion or conjecture as to . . . the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator, the
motion to dismiss should be allowed." State v. Bates. 309 N.C. 528, 533, 308 S.E.2d
258, 262 (1983). There is substantial evidence establishing that two people were in the
car that Kesler saw pull up to his house, and that the man that Kesler first saw and who
took the Honda was a second unidentified Polynesian individual who switched places
with Casanova in the interim while Kesler ran back into his house to get help.
For instance, Kesler testified that he observed a car pull up to his house and an
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individual get out. Since he only viewed the car through the side mirror of a truck
parked in his garage, he could not see if there were two individuals in the car, or whether
it was Casanova or someone else that exited the car initially and got into Kesler's Honda.
Noticeably absent from Kesler's testimony is any statement at all about the whereabouts
of the perpetrator's car when he first went out to the Honda and confronted the man
sitting in the driver's seat, suggesting that someone else (Casanova) drove it out of sight
momentarily. Similarly absent is any evidence that a car registered to Casanova was
found abandoned near Kesler's house, further suggesting that someone eventually drove
it away while Casanova was driving Kesler's Honda. Indeed, the presence of two people
in the car that pulled up to Kesler's house is only logical considering that a single driver
would not likely abandon one car to steal another.
The presence of another unidentified individual responsible for initially taking the
car and then switching places with Casanova explains Kesler's description of a man
different than Casanova. When speaking to the 911 dispatcher, Kesler described the man
that he initially saw in the car as Tongan or Polynesian. R.157[ 123-24]. He also said he
had dark hair and a mustache. IcL As evidenced by a photograph taken the same
morning when Casanova was arrested, Casanova is Hispanic, had no mustache, and only
slight facial hair above his lip and on his chin. See State's Exhibit #7. Although Kesler
offered another description of a man who was bald and had a mustache and goatee, he
explained that he was describing Casanova as he appeared at the preliminary hearing.
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R.157[145-47].
In addition, the trial court erred in concluding that Snodgrass provided
corroborating evidence identifying Casanova as the same man who initially took Kesler's
car. R.158[284]. Snodgrass was not present during the first encounter between Kesler
and the man. She came out of the house with Kesler after that initial encounter. She did
not see the man that Kesler initially confronted in the Honda. She only saw Casanova, a
different person, later when he was driving the car away. Hence, she does not provide
any corroborating testimony about the identity of the man that initially took Kesler's car.
Cf State v. Ortiz, 804 A.2d 937, 946 (Conn. App. 2002) (Evidence was sufficient to
support finding that defendant was perpetrator of robbery, although victim was unable to
identify the perpetrators because they were wearing disguises; two individuals involved
in robbery identified defendant and testified that he carried gun); Clark v. State. 564
S.E.2d 191, 192 (Ga. 2002) (trial court correctly denied motion for directed verdict as to
aggravated assault charge; although victim was unable to identify assailant, other
eyewitnesses positively identified defendant as perpetrator).
Assuming for the sake of argument only that Casanova was involved in the
alleged aggravated robbery rather than a second unidentified Polynesian individual, the
evidence is nonetheless insufficient to make a prima facie case of "force or fear" for
purposes of the aggravated robbery charge. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301; see also Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-302. Although Kesler testified that he believed the man had a gun,
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R.157[l 14,138,153], in fact he never saw a gun, the man never indicated he had a gun,
nor did he ever verbally threaten that he would hurt Kesler. R.157[137]. Indeed, the
men did not say anything at all to each other during their brief encounter at the car.
R.157[137]. Moreover, no gun was found in the Honda or on Casanova after he was
apprehended. R.157[202].

In addition, the gestures that the man made likewise fail to

establish the "force or fear" element. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301. Kesler testified that
the man let go of the steering wheel, lifted his shirt and reached toward his belt buckle.
R.157[l 13-14], However, these are only slight gestures hardly susceptible of an
interpretation of force or fear.
The case of State v. Suniville. 741 P.2d 961 (Utah 1987), demonstrates the
appropriate level of threats and gestures to establish the "force or fear" element of
robbery. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301. In Suniville, the defendant never stated that he
had a gun, nor did the teller see a gun or anything that resembled one. Id at 962.
However, he entered a bank wearing a ski mask. Id He approached a teller with his right
hand in his coat pocket, and lifted it onto the counter as if it was a gun. IcL The
defendant then said, "'[t]his is a robbery, don't turn it into a homicide. Give me all of
your money.'" IcL The Supreme Court held that this level of threats and gestures, in the
absence of an actual weapon, established the "force or fear" element of robbery. IcL at
964.
Unlike Suniville, the perpetrator in this case did not issue any verbal threats.
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R.157[137]. Nor did he make pronounced gestures calculated to appear as if he had a
gun or that readily lent themselves to such an inference. Id In the absence of that level
of behavior, the man's ambiguous actions do not provide the requisite evidence necessary
to establish a prima facie case of "force or fear." Utah Code Ann. 76-6-301.
As a final matter, Kesler's testimony going to " force or fear" is belied by his own
actions during the incident. Unlike a person who is actually afraid of being shot, Kesler
came right back outside with his family after he first ran inside upon seeing the man in
his car. Moreover, Kesler and his mother followed the man in the car for several blocks,
often times coming within a few feet of the man as they drove. Either Kesler or his
mother could have been shot during these events. Hence, if he was truly afraid of the
gun, he would not have taken such great risks. The fact that he did undercuts his
testimony going to the "force and fear" element and renders it so unbelievable that it
does not establish a prima facie case of aggravated robbery. See Taylor, 884 P.2d at
1296 (in order to make prima facie case, State must present believable evidence from
which a jury could convict beyond a reasonable doubt).
In light of the foregoing, the trial court erred in holding that the State made a
prima facie case of aggravated robbery sufficient to go to the jury. R.158[281-82].
There is not sufficient "'believable evidence,'" Emmett, 839 P.2d at 784 (quotation
omitted), to establish Casanova as the perpetrator of the alleged aggravated robbery or
the "force and fear" element. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-301 & 76-6-302. In the absence
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of "'some evidence [] from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of
[aggravated robbery could be] proven beyond a reasonable doubt,'" the trial court was
bound to grant Casanova's motion for directed verdict and abused its discretion in failing
to do so. Taylor, 884 P.2d at 1296 (quotation omitted).
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, Casanova respectfully requests this Court to reverse his
convictions since the trial court erred in upholding the State's racially motivated
peremptory strike. Moreover, the aggravated robbery conviction fails for insufficient
evidence.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this Ht day of November, 2002.

CATHERINE E. LILLY
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs .

Case No: 011919600 FS

JARED CASANOVA,
Defendant

Judge:
Date:

ROBIN W. REESE
June 17, 2 0 02

PRESENT
Clerk:
marlened
Reporter: SCHULTZ, KATHLEEN
Prosecutor: ESQUEDA, CARLOS A
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): REMAL, LISA J.
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: September 3, 1979
Video
CHARGES
1. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 05/02/2002 Guilty
2. THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 05/02/2002 Guilty
3. FAIL TO STOP/RESPOND AT COMMAND OF POLIC - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 05/02/2002 Guilty
4. ATTEMPTED ESCAPE FROM OFFICIAL CUSTODY - Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 05/02/2002 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State
Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 3rd Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
Page 1

Case No: 011919600
Date:
Jun 17, 2002

Based on the defendant's conviction of FAIL TO STOP/RESPOND AT
COMMAND OF POLIC a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to
an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
C/O COUNT I AND COUNT III TO RUN CONSECUTIVE WITH EACH OTHER /
COUNT II TO RUN CONCURRENT / COUNT IV NO SENTENCE IMPOSED / TO PAY
FULL RESTITUTION THROUGH BOARD OF PARDONS / C/O THIS CASE TO RUN
CONSECUTIVE WITH OTHER CASES ON PAROLE

Dated this j

day of

, 20^ """ .^ ---

//U^-

^

IJM^

ROBIN W. REESE
/--/^«T^*X
District Court Judge', x, ^*,y \
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